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1 Introduction
In the early years of space exploration, few nations were willing or able to expend the
resources necessary for large scale national space programs. Indeed, at that time only
the United States and Soviet Union supported such programs, while developing capabil-
ities in areas ranging from interplanetary probes to manned spaceflight. Both countries
subsequently rose to positions of unchallenged pre-eminence in space technologies and ac-
tivities. In more recent years, however, the level of international interest and activity in
the space arena has risen substantially. Various factors have contributed to this change,
including the ongoing maturation of industries and markets for communications satellites
and launch services, and the increased accessibility of developed, transferable space tech-
nologies. Furthermore, the potential benefits from space development and the advantages
of assured access to space have become increasingly characterized in strategic terms, both
for high technology growth and national security. As a result, various nations have begun
to foster promising and successful space programs, with steadily increasing capabilities and
ambitious goals. A particularly notable example is the Japanese space program, which has
progressed in less than twenty years from the 1970 launch of its first satellite to participation
in the ongoing international space station Freedom project. Such progress is impressive,
particularly given the relatively small amount of governmental funding allotted to the pro-
gram. Moreover, the Space Activities Commission (SAC) of Japan has proposed additional
(and even more ambitious) national goals for space exploration, including the development
of a space infrastructure for autonomous space activities and an eventual manned space-
flight capability. Although these objectives may not be achievable in the near term, they
seem to indicate an increase in the national priority assigned to the development of space
technology in Japan.
From the perspective of Japan, with its heavy reliance on trade and high technology
resources, such an interest in a potential high technology growth area is understandable
and perhaps even expected. Indeed, for related reasons, the Japanese program has long
sought a state of autonomy in space activities, free from the constraints of technology
licensing agreements for imported technologies and capable of independent planning and
action should a market for space technologies develop. Despite the apparent agreement on
the value and desirability of autonomy, however, little true consensus has yet developed
regarding the type of program for which autonomy is desired, or even the logical course
of action following its attainment. As in the U.S. and other countries, the commercial
potential of the space marketplace remains uncertain, at least for the near term. Moreover,
the government, daunted by the enormous expenditures required in this unproven arena, has
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continued to be cautious in its funding of system level space research and development. As
a result, government funding for the program has remained relatively low and inconsistent
with SAC goals.
In response to this funding policy, space policy-makers and interest groups in Japan
have seemingly adapted their goals and methods to the circumstances, aiming for evolu-
tionary development philosophies, greater participation in international projects, and the
cultivation of private investment and activity in the Japanese space program. According
to the rationale, the available resources of Japan can thus be optimized for growth, while
increasing the exposure of Japanese space engineers to new techniques. In addition to the
obvious goal of increasing the technological capabilities of the program, however, these ob-
jectives represent a concerted attempt to orient the capabilities of the program to private
sector demand, with the intent of supporting further growth through commercialization if
government funding does not increase. Specific elements of these efforts seemingly include
the pursuit of value-added space markets worldwide and the cultivation of potential mar-
kets in the Pacific Rim. Although privatization may indeed be crucial to the growth of
the program, it nevertheless represents a significant departure from the policies of more
exclusively public sector-oriented programs such as that of the U.S.
In the current world of high technology competition and rising costs for space ventures,
the emergence of economically powerful Japan as a space-faring nation is significant and
merits further evaluation. Such is the case not only because of the potential implications
for space-related markets and industries, but also because the evolving privatization policy
for the program differs so markedly from the funding policies of the larger scale programs.
At the same time, however, the Japanese program has seemingly utilized U.S. technical
capabilities as a benchmark for its own capability, creating an interesting conflict in pro-
gram philosophy. From that perspective, the more established and widely recognized U.S.
program provides a particularly useful and instructive standard of measurement for an anal-
ysis of the Japanese program. Moreover, a comparison of the two programs is potentially
valuable in that their operational philosophies and styles are fundamentally different, and
comparative analyses may provide insights into their relative strengths and weaknesses, as
well as their long range objectives and configurations.
Therefore, the purpose of this report is to provide a comparative analysis of the U.S.
and Japanese space programs, with an emphasis on their respective strategies for growth
and current operational philosophies and capabilities. As part of that analysis, particular
consideration shall be given to demonstrating the privatization policy of the Japanese pro-
gram relative to the public sector orientation of the U.S. program (with its less prioritized
commercialization efforts), as well as to the relative impacts of those policies on space
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activities and funding. In that regard, the Japanese program's reliance on evolutionary de-
velopment philosophies and unmanned space activities shall be established and considered
relative to the sharply contrasting activities and philosophies of the U.S. program. Evalu-
ations of program administration and structure are also included, along with an overview
of program facilities. Following the analysis of the strategies and objectives of the pro-
grams, particular consideration shall be given to the progress of each program in attaining
the goals discussed above. Finally, the study includes a detailed evaluation of the relative
technical capabilities of the two programs in selected technology areas. Conclusions based
on these analyses and data are provided, with particular emphasis given to an assessment
of the potential activities and impact of the Japanese program. A brief historical overview
of the two programs is included for reference.
2 Program History
United States The U.S. space program was formally inaugurated in 1958 with the launch
of the scientific satellite Explorer. Later that year, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) was established for the purpose of directing the nation's civilian
activities in space. Throughout the ensuing decade, the program concentrated on the de-
velopment of satellite and launch vehicle technologies, the support of solar system research,
and the creation of a manned spaceflight capability (with the ultimate objective of sending
a manned mission to the Moon). These launch technology efforts resulted in the early
models of the Titan, Atlas, and Delta launch vehicles, which were established primarily on
the basis of intercontinental ballistic missile designs developed by the U.S. Department of
Defense (DoD); and the powerful Saturn series. Descendents of all but the Saturn remain in
operational use today. In addition to such development activities, the program conducted
unmanned research missions throughout the solar system, including the Pioneer probes to
the Moon and Sun, the Mariner probes to Mars and Venus (with the U.S. achieving the
first flyby in both cases), and the Ranger, Lunar Orbiter, and Surveyor missions to the
Moon. Following the Mercury and Gemini manned programs, the decade culminated with
the Apollo manned lunar landing in 1969.
In the early 1970s, the U.S. conducted additional manned missions to the Moon, fol-
lowed by the Skylab space station program. At the same time, the program continued its
exemplary efforts in space science and applications. For example, interplanetary probes
with multiyear mission plans were sent to Mercury (Mariner), Jupiter and Saturn (Pio-
neer, Voyager), Uranus (Voyager), and Neptune (Voyager), nearly completing the tour of
the solar system. The Viking mission to Mars in 1975 involved the first soft landing on
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the planet's surface. In addition, satellite technologies for communications, surveillance,
broadcasting, meteorology, and remote sensing were further developed and evaluated, while
scientific satellites for X-ray and infrared astronomy were designed and launched. Finally,
in the search for more cost-effective launch technologies and a new agenda for NASA, the
U.S. program developed the Space Transportation System (STS, also known as the Space
Shuttle), the world's first reusable, manned spacecraft. The STS program gradually became
the focal point for NASA's efforts as the program entered the 80s.
During the 1980s and beyond, the program continued the operation of the STS, while
beginning the development of the international space station Freedom. Following the STS
Challenger accident in 1986, however, the U.S. experienced a period of program reevaluation
and launch capacity shortages. Renewed support for expendable launch vehicles resulted
from the incident. Despite a significant decrease in the overall number of space science
missions, the Magellan and Galileo probes were launched to Venus and Jupiter, respectively,
and the Hubble Space Telescope was successfully placed in orbit (further comments on the
Galileo and Hubble projects are provided in a later section regarding space science). As of
the writing of this report, over 900 successful launches of spacecraft have been conducted.
Japan The Japanese space program formally began in 1955, when a small group of
scientists at the University of Tokyo successfully designed and launched a small solid fuel
sounding rocket known as the Pencil rocket. This group was led by a medical technology
student, who became fascinated with space technologies while studying in the U.S. and
ultimately studied rocket technology upon his return to Japan. Within ten years, the
National Space Activities Council (NSAC), the Institute of Space and Aeronautical Science
(University of Tokyo), and the National Space Development Center (NSDC) had been
established for conducting the nation's space activities. Throughout this time period, the
program attempted unsuccessfully to domestically design and build a solid fuel launch
vehicle for access to Earth orbit.
Due to growing concern regarding the nation's slow rate of space technology develop-
ment, the Japanese government established the SAC in 1968 and the National Space De-
velopment Agency (NASDA) in 1969, replacing the NSAC and NSDC. Shortly thereafter,
the program imported (through licensing agreements) Delta 2914 launch vehicle technol-
ogy from the U.S. to speed the technology development efforts in Japan. Nevertheless,
the 1970 launch of the satellite Osumi occurred on a solid fuel vehicle developed by the
Institute group at the University of Tokyo. With the launch of the Osumi, Japan became
the fourth nation in the world to place a satellite in orbit. After extensive political debate,
the university group and NASDA were subsequently allowed to remain separate, with dif-
fering responsibilities (more discussion on this administrative framework will be provided
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in the following section), facilities, and launch vehicles. To avoid conflict with NASDA
efforts, however, the Institute's efforts to develop launch vehicles were limited to vehicles
with diameters of 1.4 meters or less. The group ultimately went on to develop a series of
launch vehicles known as the M-series, all demonstrating slight improvements in capability.
On the basis of the Delta technology, NASDA proceeded to develop the N-series of launch
vehicles.
Throughout the 1970s, the two organizations gradually developed a national resource
base in space technologies. In terms of applications, NASDA concentrated on the devel-
opment of satellite and launch vehicle technologies. Specific programs included an experi-
mental satellite series for evaluating basic technologies; a series of programs for developing
communications, broadcasting, remote sensing, and meteorological satellites; and the efforts
to develop an indigenous launch vehicle. Following the N-series of vehicles, these efforts led
to the partially indigenous H-I vehicle, which is the primary vehicle in use today, and to
the decision to develop the completely indigenous H-II. With regard to space science, the
University of Tokyo group continued to design and launch scientific satellites, concentrating
its efforts in the areas of X-ray astronomy, upper atmospheric studies, and solar physics.
In 1981, the group was reorganized into the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science
(ISAS).
Significant program developments in recent years have included the 1985 decision to
participate in the international space station Freedom project and the successful com-
pletion of flyby missions to Halley's Comet and the Moon. In addition, recent design
efforts have included work on an unmanned, reusable spacecraft known as the H-II orbiting
plane (HOPE). At the writing of this report, over forty launches have been successfully
conducted[2].
3 Administrative Structure and Facilities
Whether comparing absolute size, the number and nature of operating centers, or ba-
sic administrative divisions, the administrative framework and structure of the U.S. and
Japanese space programs contain fundamental differences. In many ways, these differences
are reflective of the unique origins of the programs, as well as the differing expectations
and perceptions within each nation regarding the appropriate role for a space program.
For example, the U.S. space program was created during a period of intense competition
with the Soviet Union in the space technology arena. In particular, the two nations were
"racing" to develop the world's first manned spaceflight capability and conduct the first
manned landing on the Moon. The result was an early orientation to ambitious, large scale
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projects involving widespread operations in a variety of field centers and the mobilization of
tremendous resources. This initial focus established a precedent for such projects (including
manned activities) and influenced the philosophy and administrative organization of the
program. Partial evidence of this fact is provided by the composition of the unwieldy array
of centers in existence today, most of which were established during this period. Further-
more, space development activities were perceived to have national security implications.
Consequently, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) was involved in the program from
its inception.
In contrast, the initial activities of the Japanese space program were small in scope
and oriented to the university by nature. Moreover, these activities primarily consisted
of technology development efforts rather than manned spaceflight activities or similarly
scaled projects. Although recent Japanese space policy statements call for an enlargement
of the sphere and scale of activity, many aspects of the style and administrative structure
of the program still reflect this modest beginning and the lower initial priority assigned to
the program. For example, the program maintains comparatively few centers and supports
a small staff relative to the U.S. program. In addition, the centers currently in existence
remain suited to smaller scale technology development projects rather than extended op-
erations. In another area of contrast with the U.S. program, the initial objectives for the
program did not include the utilization of space technologies in defense-related activities.
Such is still the case today, as the Japanese space program does not formally support any
military activities and contains no DoD equivalent in its organizational structure.
Since the operations and objectives of both programs are greatly influenced by their
individual structures, further analyses of the structure and administrative framework for
each program are provided below. A brief overview of each program's facilities is also
included.
United States The management of space activities in the U.S. is primarily concentrated
within two organizations - the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and
the Department of Defense (DoD). Although both are governmental agencies promoting the
development and utilization of space, their roles, responsibilities, and styles are quite dif-
ferent. For example, NASA was originally conceived as a research and development agency,
with an emphasis on the peaceful exploration and development of space. Consequently, a
fundamental objective of the agency is ostensibly the general advancement of science and
technology in space-related technical disciplines. With regard to mission philosophy, the
agency has historically been oriented to the design and completion of specific missions and
projects, as opposed to the operation and continuous support of comprehensive space sys-
tems (such as those required in military space activities). With the advent of the STS and
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the plans for the international space station, however, NASA has begun to add a significant
operational element to its sphere of activities and responsibilities. In terms of governmental
organization and identity, NASA is an non-departmental agency with a specific charter.
In comparison, the DoD's space activities naturally concentrate on national defense
and security. Specific activities in this arena consist of surveillance, meteorological studies,
navigational support, mapping, and the maintenance and support of a variety of satel-
lite communications systems. In addition, the Department supports the development and
acquisition of launch vehicles and other technologies perceived to be necessary for the ful-
fillment of national security objectives. Due to the requirement for continuous operational
capability and the high number of operational units in many military space systems (such
as the communications or surveillance satellite systems mentioned above), the procurement
process of the DoD generally involves the acquisition of multiple - and often redundant -
units of various space systems and system components. Although this "stockpiling" ap-
proach is frequently necessary to ensure the operational capability of these systems, it also
provides the benefit of sustaining the industrial base for those technologies.
Despite such differences in operational objectives and philosophy, joint projects between
the agencies sometimes occur. A current example is the National Aerospace Plane (NASP)
project, involving the development of technologies and designs for a craft capable of tak-
ing off and landing horizontally and operating under power in both the atmosphere and
space. Furthermore, DoD technology initiatives have frequently been of benefit to NASA,
particularly in the areas of satellite technology and launch vehicle development. Indeed,
most of the Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELVs) in the U.S. inventory are derivatives of
launch vehicles originally developed by the DoD for military purposes. Although the ELV
example is more of an exception than a general rule, some technology transfer is almost
inevitable, since the companies developing the technologies for both agencies are often the
same. Nevertheless, stringent security restrictions and mission incompatibilities have often
served to discourage a more complete or institutional transfer of technology.
In terms of larger facilities, NASA currently maintains ten field centers, which are in-
volved in a variety of activities. These facilities consist of three research centers, including
the Langley, Ames, and Lewis Research Centers; the Goddard Space Flight Center, oriented
to space science and technology applications; five primary space flight centers, including
the Kennedy, Johnson, and Stennis Space Centers, Marshall Space Flight Center, and Wal-
lops Station; and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), involved in scientific missions and
planetary studies[3]. A variety of smaller facilities exist for testing and data acquisition.
In addition, the U.S. program has access to Vandenberg Air Force Base, a launch center
affiliated with the DoD. The number of people directly employed by NASA at these instal-
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lations is approximately 23,900, while private contractors provide the services of roughly
33,000. Private contractors involved with the program include production firms as well as
smaller companies providing support services. The total number of employees affiliated
with the NASA portion of the program is approximately 56,900.
Of the space flight centers mentioned above, three - Kennedy, Vandenberg, and Wallops
(used primarily for the launch of sounding rockets) - provide actual launch facilities to the
U.S. program. These installations contain a wide array of launch complexes and pads,
although many are currently inactive. At the present time, however, only the Kennedy
Space Center provides active launch services for the STS. Although Vandenberg currently
has "mothballed" STS facilities, the facilities are scheduled to be converted for Titan IV use
in the early 1990s. The Vandenberg facility allows access to polar orbit without overland
flight. In terms of launch rates, these facilities can presently support approximately ten
Delta, ten Atlas I/II, six Titan IV, and ten to twelve STS launches per year. After the
conversion of the Vandenberg STS facilities, the Titan IV pads should be capable of ten
launches per year.
Japan The management of Japanese space activities is also divided among two distinct
organizations - the National Space Development Agency (NASDA) and the Institute for
Space and Astronautical Sciences (ISAS) - both operating within the policy guidance of
SAC. However, the similarity to the multiorganizational structure of the U.S. ends there,
as neither Japanese organization is oriented to defense applications. More accurately, the
Japanese program structure represents a division of NASA's responsibilities into two sep-
arate bodies. With respect to objectives, NASDA is responsible for the development of
application satellites and launch vehicles and the acquisition and utilization of system
data[4]. On a much smaller scale, its organizational responsibilities are comparable to the
combined responsibilities of the Kennedy, Johnson, and Stennis Space Centers and the
Marshall Space Flight Center within NASA. The organization operates under the govern-
mental authority of the Science and Technology Agency (primarily), the Ministry of Posts
and Telecommunications, and the Ministry of Transport.
In comparison, ISAS is oriented to the launch and development of scientific satellites
and the general promotion and support of the space science field, including space science
projects and relevant research[5]. Although smaller and lesser funded than NASDA, ISAS
nevertheless benefits from this administrative separation through the ability to protect its
appropriated funding from the budgetary needs of NASDA projects. As shall be discussed
in more detail in the funding section, such budgetary "raids" have long been a handicap
for space science activities within the U.S. program, as science funding has frequently been
channeled to the manned programs in times of budgetary need. In terms of identity, ISAS
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is primarily associated with the university community (due to its origins in the University
of Tokyo). Its organizational responsibilities are comparable to the functions of the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory and some aspects of the Goddard Space Flight Center within NASA.
The Ministry of Education holds governmental authority over the Institute.
At the present time, the two organizations are completely independent, maintaining
their own funding, projects, management, and launch facilities and vehicles. Indeed, their
operational style and philosophy are separate and distinct. Nevertheless, a new policy
objective of SAC is the promotion of greater cooperation and interaction between the orga-
nizations. This initiative would necessitate improved interorganizational communication.
In the area of installations, the Japanese program maintains six large facilities, with
a variety of smaller testing, data acquisition, and tracking stations providing support ser-
vices. The major installations include the Tanegashima and Kagoshima Space Centers,
utilized for H-series and M-series launches, respectively; the Tsukuba Space Center, ori-
ented to research; the Kakuda Propulsion Center, central in the development of Japan's
launch vehicle capability; and the Earth Observation and Space Data Analysis Centers,
oriented to the acquisition and analysis of satellite data[2]. The number of individuals
directly employed by NASDA and ISAS at these installations is approximately 1,280, while
the private sector provides the services of roughly 9,100 employees to space development
efforts. The corporate employees consist primarily of technical personnel, who also work
on defense and corporation-specific projects in their area of expertise[6]. The total number
of employees affiliated with the Japanese space program is approximately 10,380, or less
than 1/5 the number of U.S. space-related employees. Although the U.S. figure includes
support services personnel, this dramatic difference in staffing nevertheless reflects a much
smaller resource base in terms of experienced technical personnel. Without a significant
increase in trained personnel or an influx of outside expertise, the low number of employees
with experience in space technologies, systems, and operations could limit the growth and
future activities of the program.
With regard to launch capacity and the potential for growth, both of the Japanese
launch sites suffer from severe launch restrictions due to limited physical area. For example,
the Tanegashima site currently has only one pad for the H-I and will have just one pad
for the H-II when construction is completed. In comparison, the Delta launch vehicle
of the U.S. has three pads, the Atlas has three pads, and the Titan IV will have four
pads (when the conversion is completed). In addition, the launch activities at the two
sites are constrained to the periods of January/February and August/September by an
agreement between the government and Japanese fishermen. The fishermen believe that
the launching of rockets disturbs the fish and thereby lessens their catch. As a result,
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NASDA pays the fishermen an annual stipend for compensation. Although the possibility
of negotiating higher launch rates has been discussed in MITI and program position papers,
the problem may remain somewhat intractable given the political strength of the fishing
lobby and the reluctance of the members of the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
to aggravate a critical portion of its constituency. In the near term, both factors impose a
serious constraint on Japan's launch capabilities and potential to gain greater operational
experience in launching.
Although the program's existing launch capacity has thus far been sufficient for its low
requirements, an increase in launch demand due to the addition of commercial launch com-
mitments or more ambitious program initiatives would necessitate a growth in capability.
In view of the limitations in land area and the normal restrictions regarding launch pad
safety zones (particularly for commercial launches and their related insurance stipulations),
such facilities would almost surely have to be located off the Japanese mainland, possibly
through a launch site agreement with another nation. Such agreements are possible in
principle, as evidenced by the recent agreement between the Soviet Union and Australia to
launch the Zenit rocket from Cape York (under the supervision of an American firm and
the Australian government). However, the costs of an offsite launch agreement could be
prohibitive, and a substantial increase in launch demand would be necessary to balance the
expense. Until sufficient demand has been established, these factors will likely limit both
Japan's entrance to the commercial launch arena and the frequency and scale of its future
manned activities.
4 Program Objectives and Strategy
Both the U.S. and Japanese governments have recently released policy statements regarding
space development and exploration. As official guidelines for development and indicators of
national interests in space, these statements provide a useful frame of reference for evaluat-
ing the potential objectives and capabilities of the two programs. Furthermore, the official
positions merit review in that they partially reflect each nation's strategies and institutional
mechanisms for development. Despite the usefulness of the statements, however, they only
partially enumerate the more fundamental goals and motivations seemingly associated with
each program. To the extent possible, therefore, such factors shall also be considered in the
following section, along with the observable strategies for development. Detailed analyses
of each nation's progress in achieving these goals will be provided in later sections.
United States In order to understand the current goals and philosophies of the U.S.
10
_1_·__ r_ll__l__l______.--_
space program, one must first consider the program's origins and initial objectives. As
discussed previously, these initial activities were fundamentally shaped by the evolving
superpower conflict with the Soviet Union, and the related race to place a man on the moon
and establish superiority in military space systems. Additional shaping influences on U.S.
space policy consisted of the basic national perceptions at the time regarding the prestige
and appeal of space exploration, combined with the proudly held image of the U.S. as a
technology pioneer and world leader. The combination of these factors predictably created
an early orientation to national security and the publicly visible manned activities, as well
as to ambitious, large scale projects and extended operations in general. In the process,
institutional and societal precedents and expectations for such activities and projects were
established.
Although much has transpired since the successful Apollo program and the public en-
thusiasm of those early years, including the somewhat regrettable focus on the STS in the
1970s and the relative stagnation of the 1980s, the policies of the U.S. space program are
still largely influenced by the same basic precepts. Indeed, many of the primary goals de-
fined in recent policy statements are essentially the same as those of earlier years, including
the increased human exploration of space (through the international space station and a
potential manned journey to Mars), the support of national security related requirements,
and the renewed support of a diverse range of activities in space science. More specific
(and significantly lesser funded) initiatives consist of the rejuvenation of basic research in
space technologies, the development of a high capacity launch system, and the somewhat
revitalized efforts to encourage private sector involvement. Though such objectives contain
elements of pragmatism for an established space faring nation, they nevertheless seem more
closely linked to an overriding desire to perpetuate U.S. leadership in space activities and
preserve the form and nature of the current program. A more concise and directed plan
does not seem to exist. Furthermore, as evidenced by the current Mars initiative, the U.S.
view of space leadership is still largely defined in terms of public sector projects of the scale
and nature of the Apollo program.
With regard to financing strategies, the U.S. space program has historically been sup-
ported through government funding and procurement. In view of the high risk (and longer
term) nature of space investment and the type of U.S. project envisioned for the near fu-
ture, the funding and support for U.S. space development activities will almost certainly
remain in this form. Consequently, the primary mechanisms for development will continue
to be NASA and the DoD, acting as administrators and project managers for contracts
awarded to various corporations. Although private sector investment and involvement in
the space program have been the subject of much discussion and some experimentation,
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further incentives and guarantees will apparently be required before private sector organi-
zations invest at a level sufficient to sustain development activities (more analysis of the
status of these efforts will be provided in a later section). Moreover, company consortia
designed to promote, manage, and utilize space technologies, such as those seen in Europe
and Japan, for the most part do not exist.
In the meantime, incentives for the private sector will be provided through government
commitments to employ U.S. firms for certain services and to act as "anchor tenants" for
space-related private firms. For example, the U.S. government has made a commitment to
use only U.S. launch vehicles for government payloads. As one effect of this reliance on
government contracts and initiatives, however, the capabilities of the U.S. program may
ultimately be tailored to the larger scale and more expensive requirements and projects of
NASA and the DoD, rather than those of companies interested in accessing or developing
markets for space technologies. For example, the original plan to divert materials research
to the space station could have made the costs of experimentation prohibitive for smaller
companies, as opposed to less costly methods such as drop towers, sounding rockets, bal-
loons, or even unmanned orbiting platforms. This orientation to larger scale public projects
may limit the number of residual technologies emanating from the program, in addition to
slowing the transfer of technologies between the public and private sectors.
Japan From its inception the activities and goals of the Japanese space program have
focussed on the gradual development of basic space technologies and the pursuit of auton-
omy in space. Current initiatives resulting from these objectives include the development
efforts for satellite technologies and the completely indigenous, potentially world class H-II
launch vehicle. As mentioned previously, such objectives in a potentially strategic growth
area are easily fathomed for Japan, particularly in view of its dependence on trade and high
technology resources. Despite the general agreement on the end objective, however, true
consensus has not yet developed with regard to the appropriate process for the required
development. Some groups (represented by such notable spokesmen as Ryuji Kuroda, the
General Manager of NEC) have favored a combined public and private sector program sup-
ported through substantial government funding, while others have recommended the more
typical Japanese approach to fostering technological growth in high risk areas - the reliance
on the private sector to tailor its development efforts and emerging capabilities to existing
(and potential) markets[7]. The more prominent view within the government has seemingly
been to provide low yet stable near term funding for establishing initial capabilities, while
encouraging private sector investment and involvement for sustaining long term growth.
Within the resulting budgetary limitations, Japanese space policy-makers have been forced
to rely on a combination of evolutionary development philosophies and the importation of
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technologies through licensing agreements.
By the mid-1980s, however, a combination of factors had evolved which enhanced the
commercial appeal of space technologies and ultimately increased the emphasis on space
development activities within Japan. Firstly, certain industries and markets for space tech-
nologies, such as those for communications satellites and satellite systems, had matured to
levels sufficient for self-support and profitable entry. Furthermore, other arenas, such as the
areas of materials research and remote sensing, had begun to demonstrate clear promise for
growth. Finally, the U.S. space program proposed the international space station project,
providing a valuable opportunity for the Japanese to gain from the knowledge and expe-
rience of other programs, as well as to acquire international visibility and prestige in this
high technology arena. Such factors led to renewed political and corporate interest in the
development of indigenous technologies and the potential commercialization of space. On
the basis of that enthusiasm, program planners began to actively seek methods to enlarge
the scope, range of capabilities, and funding of the space program. These efforts are re-
flected in the recent policy statements for the program, which center on the now familiar
issue of autonomy, Japanese participation in and support of international space projects
and activities, the cultivation of private investment and involvement in the space program,
and the furtherance of activities in space science[8].
The common theme in these objectives is the underlying goal of increasing the scope,
capabilities, and commercial appeal and value of the program, without a corresponding
increase in government funding. That is to say, the underlying goals for the program are
self-sufficiency and privatization, with an associated reduction of government responsibil-
ity for the program. From this perspective, the rationale for the stated policy objectives
can be demonstrated in various ways. To begin with, the state of autonomy creates ob-
vious advantages for long term planning, decision-making, and growth. This remains true
whether or not the Japanese program ultimately supports manned activities or larger scale
projects. For example, the related development of indigenous capabilities would enable the
program to cultivate existing and potential markets for space technologies in the Pacific
Rim, thereby stimulating potentially critical demand for the private sector. Moreover, in-
digenous capabilities increase the appeal of the Japanese space program as a partner in
international space ventures. Participation in such projects should enable Japanese engi-
neers and scientists to acquire knowledge and experience in advanced space technologies
for a fraction of the cost of truly autonomous development. Finally, indigenous technolo-
gies and capabilities should allow greater access to value-added industries and markets for
space subsystems. Both the potential to access value-added industries and the possibility
of supporting and interacting with regional space industries constitute the prerequisite el-
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ements for the ultimate strategic objective - an increase in private sector investment and
involvement. As discussed by Eberstadt in a related study, the strategy for obtaining that
objective can be generally characterized in terms of 1) the creation of private sector orga-
nizations to develop and market commercially-relevant space technologies and capabilities,
and 2) the encouragement of markets and demand for these products and services[9].
In terms of creating private organizations for managing space technologies, the program
has already made some notable progress. Specific examples will be dealt with in more
detail in a later section regarding the current status of the initiatives described above.
As a brief overview, however, policy-makers in Japan have recently fostered the creation
of corporate consortia for providing launch services (the Rocket Systems Corporation);
developing and marketing the technologies and equipment for the Japanese portion of the
international space station (the Japanese Manned Systems Corporation); and managing the
utilization of the reusable experimental platform known as the Space Free Flier, scheduled
for launch in the mid-1990s (the Institute for Unmanned Space Experiments with free Fliers
- USEF). Each of these organizations represents a significant step towards privatization and
the reduction of government responsibility for the space program. More importantly, the
organizations and corresponding structure constitute an effective positioning of Japanese
space industries for developing and marketing space technologies and services in the event
that commercial markets emerge.
With regard to the stimulation of demand, the various strategies center on two separate
efforts - 1) the creation of organizations and consortia to facilitate the growth of markets
and demand for space technologies, and 2) the cultivation and support of potential markets
in the Pacific Rim. Although further detail will again be provided in the later section men-
tioned above, notable examples of foundations and company consortia in this area include
the Japanese Space Utilization Promotion Center (JSUP), and the Space Technology Cen-
ter (STC). As a non-profit foundation, JSUP is intended to discover and promote potential
uses for the space station, in addition to serving as a representative for the interests of
space industries as users. In comparison, the STC was created to conduct research and
development activities for electronics-related materials processing in the microgravity en-
vironment. In terms of stimulating programs in the Pacific Rim, the program intends to
concentrate on communications technologies and possibly launch services, with the assis-
tance of existing governmental mechanisms such as the Japan International Cooperation
Agency(JICA)[11]. If successful, this initiative would further provide a means of growth
and sustenance to the program and its related space industries.
However, it should be noted that such growth assistance agencies in Japan are often
understaffed and inadequately prepared for providing such aid. For example, JICA, which
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is responsible for technical feasibility studies and assistance, has fewer staff persons now
than in 1977, when it was already poorly staffed relative to such admittedly overextended
operations as the World Bank. Moreover, many of the experts in the agency are not fluent
in other languages[10]. Consequently, the effectiveness of the agency in facilitating space
program growth in other countries may be limited for the near future.
5 Funding and Program Management
The evaluation of funding practices and budgetary trends is critical to the comparison
of the two programs, since these factors directly impact program effectiveness, internal
policy, and management. Moreover, the trends in funding are significant in that they
reflect and illustrate the different origins and long term strategies of the two programs.
For example, the U.S. program has traditionally relied on public sector management and
demand, while basing its activities on a large operating budget. In contrast, the planners
for the Japanese program have hoped to stimulate private demand and establish commercial
utility, with only minimal government investment. Furthermore, the U.S. program places a
higher priority on manned space activities and large scale projects (as already discussed),
whereas the Japanese program has typically focussed on gradual technology development
efforts and smaller scale, unmanned activities. As a result of such factors, the U.S. space
budget is substantially larger than the space budget in Japan. Further evaluations of
these characteristics and their effect on program management are provided in the following
sections, along with funding histories for the last decade and a brief overview of the politics
of space funding in each country.
United States Although high in comparison to other nations, the funding for the U.S.
space program has often been inconsistent with program goals and unstable on the project
level. Various factors have contributed to these trends, including the disparity of views
within the government regarding the activities and objectives of the space program, the
inability of program planners to adapt to longer term shifts in political and public support,
and a tendency within the program to underestimate costs for potential projects. In addi-
tion to their individual importance, however, the significance of these factors is magnified
by the budgetary process of the U.S. In particular, the U.S. government reviews its budget
annually, but without systemic guarantees or commitments to items in budgetary areas
considered to be discretionary (such as the space program) rather than essential. Conse-
quently, changes in administration and/or political priorities can have a dramatic impact
from year to year on the existing and proposed funding for such categories.
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With regard to the space program, which exists on moderate and relatively unstable
levels of political and public support, the level of governmental funding and commitment for
specific projects is often highly variable. Evidence of this characteristic is plentiful, though
an extreme example is the Galileo project (discussed in the technology assessment section),
which was canceled four times and revived five times in less than twelve years. Moreover,
the political conditions producing this state of budgetary instability are reinforced and often
provoked by the program's frequent difficulties in project management and cost estimation.
As a result, project cancellations and funding reductions are common. Since the activities
of the space program frequently involve multiyear research and development schedules and
long production lead times, these fluctuations and uncertainties in the annual operating
budgets for projects typically have a deleterious effect on the management efficiency of the
program.
In addition to these trends in project management, however, the perpetual discrepancies
between the institutional (and societal) expectations for the program and the politically
available budget have profoundly affected the philosophy and selection of projects within
the space program. The resulting effects can be loosely summarized as 1) a fundamental
orientation toward revolutionary, or technologically unique, projects, and 2) a propensity
for the creation of "megaprojects" (or projects large in scale and scope), in both manned
and unmanned programs. Both types of project have typically been portrayed as necessary
to generate public and political support for the program and thereby maintain funding.
They have also been defended as productive overall, since the U.S. space program has
established a spectacular record of "firsts" through this approach.
Despite the relative benefits in such respects, however, this style of operation has also
limited the overall efficacy of the program in the use of public resources. For example, one
result of the orientation to revolutionary projects has been a corresponding tendency to
discard or underutilize proven technologies in the perennial search for such projects. Indeed,
the history of the U.S. space program is replete with examples of this behavior, including
the Saturn V launch vehicle, the Skylab project, and the X-15 experimental rocket plane,
to name but a few. Other projects, such as the Landsat remote sensing satellite series, have
only narrowly avoided this fate. In terms of the efficient use of government investments,
a tendency of this nature is extremely wasteful, providing few opportunities to reduce
unit costs through long term usage and lessen the effects of initial development costs.
Nevertheless, it should also be noted that the U.S. has made evolutionary improvements to
existing systems when funding for the development of new systems was unavailable. Some
examples of this approach are the Titan, Delta, and Atlas series of launch vehicles and
many of the early space science projects conducted by NASA. The success and relative
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cost-effectiveness of these systems strongly supports the wisdom of further incorporating
evolutionary development philosophies into the development activities of the program.
The effect of the political and institutional orientation to megaprojects has also been
pronounced, though perhaps somewhat contrary to expectation. According to the prevail-
ing belief, an increase in project scope involves more production facilities and regions of
the country in the procurement process, thereby enhancing a project's chance of political
acceptance and survival. By their very nature, however, such projects are more prone to
design and management complications and related cost overruns, which in turn often in-
crease the risk of cancellation. In addition, the functional compromises inevitably entailed
in the design of large, multifunction spacecraft often lessen the effectiveness of individual
mission components and instruments. Finally, the development of the megaproject requires
much more time than that of a smaller project, creating long periods of inactivity within
the disciplines depending on the project for new scientific data. These periods have a very
detrimental impact on university research and education in space-related fields.
As another undesirable result of this operational focus on discrete, large scale projects
and the more publicly visible manned programs, basic research and development efforts
within NASA have seemingly been deemphasized (despite the nature of NASA's charter).
Indeed, the megaprojects and manned programs have often survived during funding short-
ages on the basis of funds appropriated from smaller projects and basic research. This trend
can be illustrated by the funding history of NASA's Advanced Research and Technology
division, which is responsible for the management of basic engineering research. The divi-
sion's funding has decreased from six percent of the total space budget during the Apollo
era to two percent of the current budget. Such trends indicate a significant decrease in ba-
sic research and a poor commitment to the long term requirements of the program[13]. In
recognition of this problem, however, NASA has recently begun the five-year $773 million
Civilian Space Technology Initiative (CSTI), with the intent of supporting basic technol-
ogy development efforts in areas such as automation and robotics, propulsion systems,
and information technology. The CSTI has been designed to cultivate technologies with
many potential applications, as opposed to the traditional method of relying on individual
projects to generate residual technologies[14].
Despite these disturbing patterns in the support for individual space projects and basic
research, the total funding for NASA has increased during the last five years (in terms of
constant 1985 dollars). These increases were largely due to the addition of development
funding for the space station Freedom and an increase in STS operational costs follow-
ing its 1986 grounding and subsequent renewal. Lesser factors consisted of the increased
allocations for space science in the late 1980s and the 1988-89 budgetary provisions for en-
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hanced networks for data transfer and communications[15]. For the same time period, the
DoD's space-related funding fluctuated slightly[16]. Both funding histories are presented
in tabular form in Table 1, along with the combined funding for the space activities of the
Departments of Commerce, Energy, Interior, Agriculture, and Transportation. The 1987
funding value for NASA does not include the replacement costs for the new STS orbiter.
As a function of the U.S. Gross National Product (GNP), however, the level of space
funding for NASA has remained relatively constant throughout the last decade, while the
level for the DoD has risen significantly (Figure 1). On the basis of the GNP data, one
can conclude that the priority attached to the civilian portion of the U.S. space program
Constant 1985 Dollars(millions)
FY NASA DoD Other
1985 $ 6,925 $ 12,768 $ 474
1986 $ 6,976 $ 14,614 $ 359
1987 $ 7,241 $ 14,815 $ 330
1988 $ 7,317 $ 13,138 $ 403
1989 $ 8,743 $ 13,867 $ 555
Table 1: U.S. Space Program Funding
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during that time period did not change relative to the national hierarchy of priorities. In
comparison, the priority for defense-related space funding has increased relative to other
budgetary items. This trend primarily reflects the increased defense funding of the 1980s
and a greater awareness of the operational and tactical benefits of military satellite systems.
However, some important clarifications must be added regarding the nature of U.S.
space program funding for defense activities. The DoD funding data presented in Table 1
are merely estimates for the DoD's yearly disbursements for space activities. In actuality,
the DoD does not have a formal "space budget" within its overall budget, and the yearly
estimates are simply the aggregated results of numerous accounting judgments regarding
the applicability of specific DoD program outlays to military space activities[16]. These
judgments often entail the determination of a percentage of space applicability for specific
DoD expenditures. Consequently, the space funding data available for the DoD are some-
what subjective and uncertain. Furthermore, a significant portion of the DoD's annual
spending for space is devoted to the procurement of multiple items in large scale space sys-
tems and the purchase of replacement units and components for those systems. In terms
of the effects of funding, such expenditures are quite different from disbursements for the
design and development of space technologies. Indeed, their primary benefit (other than
ostensibly enhancing the national security of the U.S.) lies in the sustainment of industrial
capabilities in the space technology area. Due to such dissimilarities and uncertainties, the
overall impact of defense-related expenditures on the activities and capabilities of the U.S.
space program is difficult to ascertain and quantify, whether the basis of measurement is
funding effectiveness or amount. Regardless of that fact, however, defense-related space
funding has unquestionably been significant in the development of U.S. capabilities in space
technologies and the sustainment of U.S. space-related industries.
Japan In direct contrast to the U.S. program, the funding for the Japanese space pro-
gram has historically been very steady, though comparatively small (Table 2)[2]. These
characteristics are primarily due to 1) the nature of the Japanese political process, which
relies on consensus and political precedent for decision-making, and 2) the strategy of re-
lying on the private sector for long term growth. With regard to the relationship between
stability and the funding process, political consensus between relevant government officials
must be established before a project concept can become a budgetary reality. This process
is inevitably long and arduous, requiring extensive negotiation and compromise (particu-
larly since the planning authority for a given area is often intentionally distributed among
many organizations in the interest of stability and consistency). Moreover, the cancellation
of a budgetary item entails similar difficulties. As a result, deviations from the budgetary
status quo are infrequent, both in terms of specific projects and proportional funding lev-
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els. Although this approach to stability certainly makes relative funding increases for a
given area difficult to obtain, it also has the benefit of making cancellations of an ongoing
budgetary item extremely rare.
With regard to program strategies and government funding, the small operating budget
for the Japanese program clearly reflects the decision within the government to avoid a large
public sector program, at least for the near term. As mentioned previously, the current
growth policies are instead based on the assumption of increased private sector activity
and low, but steady, government investment. Both the funding level and operational focus
of the program reflect a basic conflict in the Japanese view of the potential of space -
although space industries are considered a strategic area for technological growth, they
are also viewed as high risk in nature, capital intensive on the systems level, and difficult
to enter as a late-comer. As stated by Morino and Kodama in an analysis of Japanese
space policy, the current policies indicate that space technologies are considered important
to technological growth in Japan, yet space,industries overall are not necessarily viewed
as primary industries for the future[17]. In such scenarios, the Japanese government has
typically relied on the private sector to develop its capabilities in relation to exting markets.
In any event, the government funding for the program has remained low, while private
investment has only begun to emerge in the last five years.
In terms of program management, one desirable effect of these factors has been an in-
crease in stability and efficiency, both for specific projects and the overall budget. Indeed,
project cancellations in the program have been virtually nonexistent, as have cost overruns
(although this last fact is at least partially due to the equal rarity of increases in govern-
mental funding beyond negotiated levels). Through these practices the system has avoided
the inefficiency that generally results from unstable short term funding, while encourag-
ing the responsible estimation of costs. Moreover, as a function of GNP the budgetary
allotment for the program has remained essentially constant (though comparatively low)
for the last decade (Figure 1). Combined with the practice of maintaining stable support
on the project level, this consistent level of overall funding has enabled patience and long
term commitment in the development of basic space technologies - characteristics consistent
with those in other areas of Japanese industrial development. Five-year funding histories
for NASDA and ISAS are presented in Table 2, along with the combined funding for the
space-related activities of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the Ministry
of Transportation, and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.
In combination with the initial scarcity of indigenous technical experience in space-
related fields, however, the small operating budgets for the program have also virtually
mandated an evolutionary approach to development rather than revolutionary. Indeed,
20
-- ------ ~______ ---X~ --- --- 1-_-_-_(
Dollars(millions)($ 1 = 140 Yen)
FY NASDA ISAS Other Total
1985 $ 635 $ 78.3 $ 90.7 $ 804
1986 $ 648 $ 88.4 $ 102 $ 838
1987 $ 662 $ 84.4 $ 125 $ 871
1988 $ 690 $ 141 $ 182 $ 1,013
1989 $ 763 $ 91.8 $ 152 $ 1,007
Table 2: Japanese Space Program Funding
Japanese space projects have typically involved only incremental advances in technology
in concentrated areas, thus entailing relatively low development costs while generating the
highest return on investment. When necessary to further reduce development costs and
time (or overcome a technical obstacle), the Japanese program has frequently imported
"off-the-shelf" technology from other nations for adaptation to project requirements. The
N-series of launch vehicles, which utilized U.S. Delta 2914 engine and guidance technology,
is an excellent example of this approach. Another example is the Ginga X-ray astronomy
satellite, which will be discussed in more detail in a later section regarding space science.
Moreover, Japanese space projects have often been significantly smaller in scope than their
U.S. equivalents. Through this methodology, the program has avoided not only unnecessary
development costs, but also interruptions in the flow of scientific data to the university and
research communities. For example, ISAS has successfully launched nineteen scientific
satellites in just twenty years. Although the missions have often been conceptually basic,
they have provided valuable and continuous data, sometimes during periods of international
inactivity within specific scientific fields[12]. The Ginga project is again an excellent case
in point, as it provided the only new data in the field of X-ray astronomy during the late
1980s.
However, the licensing agreements for the imported technologies have also imposed
restrictions on any Japanese space activities involving those technologies. In particular,
commercial space activities and international technology transfers are prohibited by such
agreements. Moreover, the reliance on imported technologies to achieve short project turn-
around times (and thereby "catch up" to other programs) has perhaps stunted the growth
of an indigenous technical base for systems level technology development efforts. In effect,
this practice has simply postponed the technical growing pains and expenses associated
with the autonomous development of systems level technologies. Although this factor will
be discussed in more detail in the technology assessment section, evidence of this problem
has already been seen in the development efforts for the H-II launch vehicle. The project
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has suffered through numerous technical setbacks and unprecedented (for the program)
scheduling delays during development. Such facts suggest that the rapid expansion of the
program's capabilities through technology importation may be misleading.
Finally, in terms of research, the structure and funding stability of the Japanese program
have enabled high levels of consistency and efficiency in the support of space science and
basic research. Indeed, the charter of ISAS specifically calls for such research, allowing ISAS
to develop a style emphasizing creativity and self-sufficiency and minimizing bureaucracy
(very little of the ISAS budget is spent on internal paperwork). For example, ISAS typically
operates without a prime contractor for launch vehicles, completing its own designs and
inspections while consigning the actual manufacturing to Nissan Motors[12]. Moreover,
Japanese corporations have been active in funding research efforts, both in Japan and
elsewhere. The same corporations also invest time and money in employee development
through educational funding and leaves. To some degree, these initiatives may be related
to the emphasis placed on stability and commitment within Japanese society. Regardless
of the source, however, this approach allows a longer term view of resource development.
6 Status of Program Initiatives
In prior sections, information and analyses have been provided with respect to the struc-
ture, management, funding, and philosophy of the U.S. and Japanese space programs.
Each area constitutes a critical portion of the overall comparison of the capabilities of
the two programs. To further understand the potential for each program, however, these
characteristics must be further evaluated and judged within the context of the objectives
and strategies for each program. Therefore, the purpose of this section of the report is to
consider the status of the objectives and efforts described previously.
United States As earlier established, the current goals of the U.S. space program revolve
around the increased human exploration of space, the support of national security require-
ments, a rejuvenation of space science and basic research, the development of a higher
capacity, more responsive launch system, and the cultivation of private sector involvement
in the space program. More generally, the U.S. program is interested in preserving its
status as a leading world power in space exploration and development.
In terms of progress in these areas, the program has achieved varying levels of success.
For example, the objective of increased exploration is being partially fulfilled through the
design and development of the space station Freedom, with the cooperation of Japan, the
European Space Agency (ESA), and Canada. However, great uncertainty exists with regard
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to the usefulness of the current station configuration and the feasibility of supporting the
project's operating costs in the current budgetary environment of the U.S. Furthermore, in
contrast to the Japanese plans for their portion of the station, U.S. program planners no
longer envision the station as a materials processing laboratory, since costs were considered
prohibitive. Rather, the onboard experiments are expected to focus on life sciences research
and some space science. Other initiatives in the area of human exploration, such as the
potential manned mission to Mars and the possible lunar base, have been the subject of
much public and political debate, but are nevertheless still in the'study phase. Moreover,
government funding for the Space Exploration Initiative, as the two missions are collectively
known, has been reduced significantly by the U.S. Congress in the last two years. Despite
such setbacks, however, manned activities of the scale and nature of the STS and the space
station remain a cornerstone of current U.S. space policy and planning.
In terms of the support of national security requirements, the program has greatly
increased the scale and range of its activities. This trend can be demonstrated qualita-
tively through the sharp increase in defense-related space funding as a function of GNP in
the mid-1980s. In addition to establishing the policy of maintaining an alternate supply
of Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELVs) following the STS Challenger disaster, the DoD
has recently given particular attention to the upgrade of satellite systems and technolo-
gies in navigation, weather forecasting, and communications. The highly valued systems
for military surveillance have also been emphasized and continually upgraded. Recent
launch initiatives of critical importance to the overall capabilities of the program include
the support of the Advanced Launch System Technology Development Project (ALS), the
National Aerospace Plane (NASP), and the new high capacity launch system currently
under discussion. Each of these projects entails joint funding from NASA and the DoD.
The new launch system is expected to be a derivative of the STS, with the inclusion of
propulsion, computer-aided casting, and parts-reduction techniques developed in the ALS
project. This vehicle may enable the more efficient launching of space station components
(including the international modules), as well as constituting a critical element of a poten-
tial Mars mission. Initial funding for the project is expected in this fiscal year. Despite
their importance to program capabilities, however, these technologies may not be easily
transferable to the private sector in the near future, due to security restrictions and in-
compatibility. For example, many of the satellite technologies developed by the DoD are
driven by mission performance rather than cost. Such factors generally limit the usefulness
of these technologies as private sector systems.
With regard to space science, the program has achieved an increased level of funding
and established an extraordinarily ambitious agenda for the 1990s. A summary of recently
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Project Estimated Cost (billions)
Galileo $ 1.3
Hubble Telescope $ 1.9
AXAF $ 1.6
Table 3: Total Cost of Selected Space Science Projects
launched and forthcoming missions includes the Magellan and Galileo probes to Venus and
Jupiter, respectively, the Hubble Space Telescope, the Mars Observer mission, the Comet
Rendezvous/Asteroid Flyby mission (CRAF), the Cassini project, and the three remaining
elements of the Great Observatories series (excluding the Hubble). As will be discussed
in more detail in the space science section of the technology assessment, each mission
represents a significant step forward in space exploration and technical capability. Indeed,
the potential of the Great Observatory series, if realized, would simultaneously provide
a quantum leap in capability for the visible, ultraviolet, X-ray, gamma ray, and infrared
wavelengths of the spectrum. At the same time, however, many of these projects signify the
U.S. program's continued focus on revolutionary, large scale projects, often at the expense
of stable, continuous activities in a given area. Moreover, the estimated mission costs
for these projects are staggering, as illustrated by Table 3. All three estimates are larger
than the entire annual budget of the Japanese program. In addition, the U.S. program
has suffered from the management complications often associated with such projects, as
demonstrated by the Galileo scheduling problems and the well-known deficiencies in the
Hubble Space Telescope. Nevertheless, the U.S. should maintain its unparalleled renown
in space science through these projects.
In the area of basic engineering research, the U.S. program has initiated various mea-
sures to counteract the proportional decline in research funding relative to manned pro-
grams. The most notable measure of this nature is the Civilian Space Technology Initiative
(CSTI) mentioned in the previous section. The importance of the CSTI resides in its at-
tempt to develop technologies with multiple applications (a building-block approach) rather
than relying on the mechanism of discrete missions or projects to automatically generate
residual technologies. This approach will be a significant departure from many previous
NASA ventures and should prove invaluable in future development efforts. Moreover, it
has the potential to be advantageous for the private sector, since these technologies will
be more easily transferable and will represent fundamental technical capabilities rather
than mission-oriented capabilities. Areas of emphasis in the CSTI include automation and
robotics (areas of strength for the Japanese program), propulsion systems, and information
processing technologies (critical to the improved management of satellite data).
24
----- - ^~__ · _ _  _ _I_~~
With respect to private sector involvement, the U.S. program has recently shown signs
of rejuvenation in what had become a rather dormant initiative. The preceding period of
inactivity was at least partially due to a government tendency to discourage private sector
initiatives that competed with federally funded, large scale space projects. An example
of this behavior is the early 1980s policy of forcing commercial launches onto the STS, at
the expense of the emerging U.S. commercial launch industry. Such activities illustrate the
sometimes destructive results of the need to justify public sector investment, in addition to
providing an interesting contrast to the policies of the Japanese program. More recently,
however, the program has sought an increase in private sector investment to supplement the
funding for the program and provide justification for its existence through demonstrating
the commercial and competitive value of space technologies. An example of this effort is
the ongoing Commercial Experiment Transporter (COMET) project, created to provide
launch services and round-trip transportation to space for small payloads. Funding for
the program would be comprised of 45 million from NASA and contributions from vehicle
providers and payload owners. The payloads for the vehicle will primarily consist of projects
developed at NASA's sixteen Centers for the Development of Space, which are consortia of
academia and industries oriented to the development of space-related products. Although
the funding levels are still low, the Centers and the Comet project both represent truly
significant departures from previous NASA policies regarding private sector activities and
may signify a legitimate increase of support for such efforts. However, these activities do
not represent a step toward privatization of the program. Rather, they seem to point to
the supplementation of the public sector funding and activities of the program with some
lower level commercial efforts.
Less recent quasi-private initiatives consist of the financially and politically troubled
Earth Observation Satellite Corporation (EOSAT) and the management scheme for the
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), which resembles the schemes for other U.S. national
laboratories. The responsibilities of EOSAT include the management of the two remote-
sensing satellites in the U.S. Landsat system and the sale of Landsat data to commercial
users. It was originally intended to be self-sustaining. However, EOSAT has required
continuous financial support from the government and has often faced termination due to
low political support and interest. Nevertheless, the organization remains one of the two
dominant remote sensing corporations in the market, along with SPOT Image of France.
In comparison, JPL is significant among NASA field centers in that it is operated and
managed by the California Institute of Technology under a NASA contract, as opposed to
management through government personnel and systems. The advantages of this system
include greater flexibility in terms of procurement and hiring, and greater independence
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in the use of project funding. However, the funding for the Laboratory (approximately
1.1 billion per year) is still provided through NASA, the DoD, and Department of Energy.
Although not commercially oriented, JPL nevertheless represents an attempt to increase
the flexibility and efficiency of some portions of NASA's operating structure. The JPL
model is also under consideration for other NASA centers, particularly those involving
only unmanned activities.
Despite the promise of the COMET program, the somewhat equivocal success of EOSAT,
and the quasi-private facility experiment with the JPL, however, the U.S. program remains
a public sector program, with ambitions and activities unsuitable for most commercial
markets. Nevertheless, these projects and initiatives signal an increase in the effort to sup-
plement such activities with legitimate private sector projects and commercially relevant
products. If that trend were to continue, the U.S. program and its related industries would
represent a powerful combination of public investment and activities and commercially
motivated funding and efforts.
Japan As established earlier in this report, the fundamental goals of the Japanese space
program consist of increasing the scope, capabilities, and commercial utility of the pro-
gram in the short term, and attaining self-sufficiency and a state of privatization in the
long term. With regard to increasing system-level technical capabilities, the program has
already attained a certain measure of success. For example, smaller payloads can now be
reliably launched on the H-I at low launch rates, and scientific and commercial satellites
can be produced indigenously if needed. In addition, the program has established suc-
cessful satellite systems for direct broadcasting and remote sensing, as well as world class
capabilities in certain component and subsystems technologies.
As will be discussed in detail in the technology assessment section, however, these
satellite and launch capabilities are generally not yet comparable to U.S. (and world) stan-
dards of performance and cost on the integrated system level. Moreover, the 1985 and
1990 agreements between the U.S. and Japan (allowing increased competition for public-
sector satellite contracts) will further slow the rate of satellite technology development in
Japan. This situation will also be exacerbated by the relatively low domestic demand for
such technologies and the competition with land-based fiber optics networks. Nevertheless,
the commercial potential for satellite technologies and subsystems in the world market,
as well as the desire for advanced indigenous capabilities, should provide an impetus for
further development. In comparison, the prospects for Japan's future launching capacity
are less clear (particularly for larger payloads), since they will ultimately depend on the
progress and unproven performance of the H-II launch vehicle. In terms of launch rates,
the program's capabilities will also be contingent on the construction of additional launch
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sites, either on the Japanese mainland or somewhere in the region. Both options would
be costly, necessitating a substantial increase in demand from some source. In view of the
highly competitive nature of the current world market for launch services, the probability
of this occurrence in the near future is somewhat low.
In terms of subsystems and value-added industries, the Japanese program and its re-
lated industries have achieved more notable success and seemingly established much greater
potential. The strongest evidence for this statement exists in the areas of communication
satellite ground stations and component technologies. According to recent MITI figures,
Japanese industries (led by NEC in this case) now supply over 60 percent of the ground
stations for INTELSAT, as well as many of the satellite antennas and transponders for
both INTELSAT satellites and many U.S. manufacturers[7]. Although the ground station
exports are the only current case of an export surplus for Japanese space industries, these
technology areas are nevertheless classic examples of the familiar Japanese value-added
approach to market entry. Such activities are also one of the cornerstones of the Japanese
strategies for space commercialization and privatization. However, it should also be noted
that the expertise in ground station technologies was acquired during the design and con-
struction of microwave communication networks in Japan in the 1950s. Similarly, Japan's
competitive edge in transponder production corresponds to its national strength in the
production and design of miniaturized electronics. These facts strongly suggest that future
Japanese strengths in space technologies will evolve from and conform to current areas of
Japanese technical advantage. In addition, such evidence indicates that Japan will further
benefit from these attributes if the current miniaturization trend continues in space-based
broadcasting and communications systems. For example, Japanese corporations could be
expected to prosper in the markets for Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSATS) and mo-
bile communications systems hardware. An additional area with market potential could
be the sale of the indigenous LE-5 cryogenic rocket engine designed for the H-I. U.S. firms
such as McDonnell Douglas (the manufacturer of the Delta launch vehicle) have already
expressed interest in purchasing the LE-5. Each of these areas has legitimate promise as a
value-added industry for Japan.
With regard to the cultivation of markets in the Pacific Rim, Japan's efforts have thus
far involved more preparation and diplomacy than actual business or planning. Never-
theless, the region has tremendous potential as a market for communications technologies
and systems, particularly in view of the geography of such widespread island nations as
Indonesia. Indeed, Indonesia has already established a small scale space program, with
an emphasis on satellite systems and a need for launch services. In addition, the region
may contain opportunities to construct an additional launch site for less cost. Finally,
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through contractual packages providing technical assistance, financial aid, and technology
infrastructure items (such as ground stations), the Japanese program could induce demand
for its launch services and satellites. This demand could be crucial to stimulating growth
and development in Japanese space industries and services. Despite the obvious benefits
of creating such a market and the apparent government interest in doing so, the activities
in this area seem somewhat minimal at the present time.
Perhaps the most critical objective in terms of the future of the program, however, is
the goal of stimulating private sector investment and involvement in space activities, with
the intent of eventual privatization and self-sustainment. In this respect, the Japanese
program has also made some progress, particularly in terms of establishing a private sector
infrastructure for the promotion, management, and utilization of space technologies. As
already discussed, this infrastructure is primarily composed of foundations and company
consortia created for technology management and cost optimization in areas of potential
Japanese corporate activity. For example, the Rocket Systems Corporation (RSC) was
created to manage the production and sales of the H-II launch vehicle, following the example
of Arianespace in Europe. The potential benefits of this arrangement could include an
increase in vehicle reliability and a reduction in vehicle cost through the application of
mass production techniques and quality control methodologies. In particular, the RSC
could reduce vehicle cost through operating on the basis of bulk orders for parts and
subsystems.
Although this system remains untested (and may prove successful), the point must again
be made that a significant increase in launch vehicle demand and production, followed by
an increase in launch site capacity, would be necessary before these benefits could truly be
realized. This increase in demand is simply not likely in view of the increasingly competitive
market for launch services and the high estimated cost for the H-II (approximately 120
million dollars[l9]). In essence, a new market would have to develop in which the Japanese
maintained a strong presence for reasons other than cost. The only possibility of such a
market is the Pacific Rim, where the RSC would be forced to compete with another local
supplier - the highly subsidized Chinese space program. Such subsidies would be politically
infeasible for the Japanese program in the current international trade environment. As
an added drawback, the Japanese operational experience base of forty launches is simply
insufficient to prepare the RSC for a higher launch rate in the near term. Nevertheless,
the organization represents an important step toward privatization of the Japanese space
program. In addition, it demonstrates the desire of Japanese corporations to position
themselves for potential launch services markets of the future. This desire also explains the
decision to invest in a sophisticated, modern launch vehicle such as the H-II rather than a
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"dumb booster" based on older technology.
In the area of materials research and microgravity experimentation (other than on the
space station), two organizations have been established, including the non-profit Institute
for Unmanned Space Experimentation with free Fliers (USEF) and the Space Technology
Center (STC). As stated previously, USEF is expected to manage the experiments for
and use of the reusable Space Free Flier, scheduled for launch in the mid-1990s. The
Institute was initially organized through the efforts of MITI, which has seemingly identified
microgravity research as a priority for the private sector activities of the program. MITI
also contributed government funds to the development of the platform itself, along with
ISAS and NASDA (for a combined total of approximately 180 million dollars at 140 yen
per dollar). However, the funding for the Institute was provided by its thirteen member
companies (roughly seven hundred thousand dollars)[17]. USEF clearly represents an effort
by the government to transfer the management responsibilities for these experiments to the
private sector.
In comparison, the STC was founded in 1986 to conduct research and development
activities on electronic material processes in the microgravity environment. Six companies
contributed approximately 12.1 million dollars to the consortium, while the Key Tech-
nology Center (a government organization supervised by MITI) has provided 28.5 million
dollars[17]. The activities of the STC have thus far consisted of several small scale micro-
gravity experiments on small German rockets and will eventually involve participation in
German Spacelab projects. Although the funding levels for the STC are somewhat low, the
consortium nevertheless illustrates the strategy of establishing a private sector infrastruc-
ture for developing and managing space technologies. It also signals the interest of Japanese
industries and MITI in microgravity research and materials processing. In their present
form, however, the STC (and USEF) are more significant and viable from the standpoint
of positioning for future activities than current technological impact.
An additional area of consortia and activity involves the utilization of the space station
and its residual technologies. For example, the Japan Manned Space Systems Corporation
(MSSC) was recently established to develop and ultimately market the experimental capa-
bilities of the Japanese Experiment Module in the space station. The MSSC will also be
responsible for planning and coordinating the use of the module. In terms of privatization
strategies, the MSSC signals a major effort to establish private sector organizations for fa-
cilitating growth, as well as an attempt to supplement the lean government staffing of the
Japanese space program. Despite the significance of this event, however, the consortium
is not expected to be self-sustaining and will remain government supported to cover the
projected disparities between costs and receipts. In this sense the MSSC is similar to the
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quasi-private framework for EOSAT of the U.S. program. Furthermore, this organization,
like the RSC, may suffer setbacks due to a lack of experience in the operation of space
systems.
The other example of a space station-related organization is the non-profit Japanese
Space Utilization Promotion Center (JSUP), founded (and co-supervised) by MITI and the
Science and Technology Agency to discover and promote potential uses for the space station.
Established partly on the basis of contributions from 42 space-related companies, JSUP is
also intended to serve as a "consensus forum" for its corporate members - an organization
representing the interests of space industries and companies as users. Both the MSSC
and JSUP again demonstrate the interest of Japanese companies in the potential benefits
of microgravity research and space-based materials processing. In addition, they further
signify the strategy of privatizing the infrastructure for managing the development of space
technologies and stimulating demand. As has been stated previously, this philosophy is in
sharp contrast to the public sector-oriented activities and growth and demand philosophies
of the U.S. program.
However, it should be reiterated that USEF, the STC, and JSUP are primarily signifi-
cant as indicators of current Japanese strategies for developing and utilizing space technolo-
gies, rather than true privatization. At their current funding level, these organizations will
only be capable of feasibility studies, small scale experimentation, and minimal development
work. Such activities can be important to development in its early phases, and without
question the organizations reflect the interest of Japanese corporations in the potential
long term benefits of microgravity experimentation and spaced-based materials processing.
Nevertheless, their actual activities primarily represent an investigation of possibilities and
the support of initial studies. Until the level of funding and effort increases dramatically,
the results of these activities will likely remain scientifically useful but not commercially vi-
able. Moreover, the willingness of Japanese corporations to actually contribute the needed
capital remains unclear. Indeed, according to Tohru Haginoya, the senior executive direc-
tor of JSUP, Japanese manufacturers seem disinclined overall to invest in comprehensive
microgravity research at this time[18]. This view coincides with recent statements by Ger-
man researchers, who also see the commercial prospects of microgravity research as dim in
the near future. Given such trends, the emerging Japanese infrastructure for private sector
space activities signals an important step toward privatization (and perhaps ultimately
commercialization), but not privatization itself.
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7 Technology Assessment
In view of the technically advanced and complex nature of most space technologies, an
assessment of the relative technological capabilities of the two programs is an essential
component of the analysis. Such an assessment is significant not only because of the re-
lationship between technical capabilities and the attainability of program objectives, but
also because the Japanese space program has assigned a high priority to the development
of an autonomous national capability in space technology that is comparable to the U.S.
level of capability. Indeed, through a combination of focussed development efforts and in-
ternational licensing agreements, the program has produced a variety of technical successes
in space technology fields. Recent accomplishments include the indigenous development of
the LE-5 cryogenic rocket engine, the design and production of an inertial guidance sys-
tem, and the establishment of Japanese capability in three-axis-stabilization techniques for
large geosynchronous (GEO) satellites[24]. In addition, the program has shown substantial
progress in developing such key technologies as the LE-7 (an advanced cryogenic rocket
engine similar to the U.S. Space Shuttle Main Engine, or SSME), and the ETS VI, a two
ton experimental communications satellite scheduled for launch on the H-II in 1993. Both
of these technologies have potential commercial applications.
Despite the significance of such progress, however, the U.S. has maintained similar or su-
perior capabilities for some time. For example, the U.S. program developed the Centaur, the
first cryogenic engine, in 1966 and produced inertial guidance and three-axis-stabilization
technologies in the 1960s and 1970s, respectively. The U.S. experience base in these areas
is well established. Furthermore, in developing proprietary technologies the Japanese have
encountered technical difficulties similar to those experienced years ago by U.S. engineers
during the development of the same technologies. An excellent example of this scenario
is the repeated occurrence of blade failures during the testing of the impeller shroud and
turbine blades in the LE-7 turbopumps[20]. Similar problems were encountered by U.S. en-
gineers during the design of the SSMEs in the mid-1970s. Such evidence indicates that the
autonomous development of advanced space technologies entails certain difficulties, even
with the knowledge gained from observing and interacting with other programs. Moreover,
accomplishments in one area of space technology do not necessarily lead to the attainment
of an equal level of capability in other space technology disciplines. Therefore, the com-
parative analysis of the technical capabilities of the two programs ultimately requires an
evaluation of each area of space technology. Since a complete analysis of that nature is not
feasible within this format, the assessment shall instead concentrate only on the compara-
tive analysis of selected U.S. and Japanese launch vehicles, communication satellites, and
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Rocket GLOW Payload Capability Launch Cost
(Tonnes) to GEO (kg) Success(%) (Million $, 1989)
H-I 139.3 550 100 100
Delta 3920(PAM-D) 192.3 730 98.3 50
H-II 256 2000 96 (est) 117 (est)
Titan IV/Centaur 862 4536 100 180 (est)
Table 4: Comparison of the H-I,H-II, Delta 3920 and Titan IV
scientific spacecraft.
Launch Vehicles With regard to launch vehicles, Japan has recently initiated the H-
series of launch vehicles to replace the highly successful N-series and improve the launch
capabilities of the program. Of this series, the H-I is currently in operation, while the
initial launch of the H-II is scheduled for 1993. Since the medium capacity H-I was first
launched in 1986, a suitable U.S. vehicle for comparison is the Delta 3920 PAM-D[23],
also of medium capacity and first available in 1982. When fully operational, the H-II
will provide the program's maximum payload launch capacity. Therefore, an appropriate
U.S. expendable vehicle for comparison is the Titan IV, which provides the largest launch
capacity in the U.S. fleet of expendable launch vehicles. A summary of launch vehicle
characteristics is provided in Table 4[1].
Representing the largest launch vehicle in the current Japanese family of vehicles, the
H-I is a three stage launch vehicle utilizing the U.S. Delta MB-3 engine as the first stage,
the LE-5 engine as the second stage, and an indigenous solid fuel motor for the third stage.
The MB-3 burns a storable propellant, which is a hypergolic fuel (a fuel that ignites upon
mixing), while the LE-5 uses the liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen combination. As is typical
for engines using liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen rather than storable propellants, the 450
second specific impulse of the cryogenic LE-5 is much higher than that of the first stage
(258 seconds). Nine solid rocket boosters (SRBs) are included in the design for augmented
thrust at liftoff. In addition, the vehicle has a restart capability provided by the LE-5.
Vehicular guidance is accomplished with a tuned, stable platform inertial guidance system.
Although the LE-5 is cryogenic and regeneratively cooled, it utilizes an open loop cycle
and incorporates a gas generator for the turbopumps, rather than using the hydrogen bleed
technique[22]. As a result, the reliability of the restart function is lower than otherwise
possible.
In comparison, the Delta 3920 PAM-D is a three stage launch vehicle utilizing storable
propellant engines for the first and second stages and the spinning, solid fuel PAM-D
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as the upper stage. The first stage consists of a Rocketdyne RS-27, rather than the less
powerful MB-3 used in earlier Deltas and the H-I. In addition, the second stage has a restart
capability. As with the H-I, nine SRBs are provided for thrust augmentation. Guidance
for the vehicle is accomplished with a strapdown inertial unit.
Both vehicles provide a restart capability and the navigational accuracy of an inertial
guidance system, thereby adding versatility and efficiency to mission design and operation.
Although the H-I utilizes sophisticated cryogenic technology in the second stage, the first
stage consists of the 1960s vintage, less efficient MB-3 engine. Therefore, the H-I does
not demonstrate the large reduction in liftoff weight typically associated with cryogenic
technology (relative to the Delta). Moreover, the Delta delivers a larger payload to GEO
for a lower cost. In terms of reliability, the Delta offers a long and successful operational
record, with 188 successful launches out of 200 attempts for various Delta models over a
thirty year period, and a 98.3 percent launch success rate for the last fifteen years. Although
the H-I has not failed in five launch attempts, its reliability has not yet been statistically
established. On the basis of such evidence, the conclusion is that the overall technology
level of the two vehicles is comparable, despite the superior sophistication of the LE-5
engine. From the standpoint of performance, however, the Delta is superior, particularly in
view of its higher payload capability and significantly lower launch cost. Although the H-I
has not been proposed as a commercial launch vehicle, its performance limitations relative
to such vehicles as the Delta would lessen its appeal in a competitive market for medium
class launch services.
With regard to the H-II and Titan IV comparison, the fully indigenous H-II launch
vehicle is a two stage design using the cryogenic LE-7 and LE-5A engines as the first and
second stages, respectively. Two large, thrust-vectored SRBs are included in the design
for thrust augmentation and control. Since both engines burn the combination of liquid
hydrogen/liquid oxygen, the H-II will have a low liftoff mass. In terms of engine technology,
the LE-5A is similar to the LE-5, except for the incorporation of a hydrogen bleed cycle
to drive the turbopump. As mentioned previously, this method is more reliable during
restart. The LE-5A also provides a hydrazine thruster Reaction Control System for control
in the coast phase, while employing its gimbal-mounted thrust chambers for control in
powered flight. Although currently still under development, the LE-7 engine is a closed
cycle, staged-combustion design similar in concept to the SSME. However, the LE-7 utilizes
one turbopump for the fuel mixture rather than two, while operating at lower chamber
pressures (and therefore generating less thrust). Vehicular guidance will be accomplished
with a strap down inertial guidance system incorporating ring laser gyros. Both the LE-7
and the guidance system involve the use of sophisticated technology[21]. Although the first
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launch of the H-II will not occur until 1993, the initial reliability estimate for the vehicle
is 96 percent.
In comparison, the Titan IV can be launched as either a two or three stage launch
vehicle, with the first and second stages utilizing storable propellant and the third stage
(when applicable) consisting of either the cryogenic Centaur or the Inertial Upper Stage
(IUS) developed for the Shuttle. The basic vehicle design includes two large SRBs for thrust
augmentation and an inertial guidance system. In addition, the engine thrust chambers
are gimbal-mounted for vehicle control. Although neither the first or second stages have
a restart capability, the Centaur and IUS upper stages offer mission versatility within the
transfer orbit. Despite the inefficiency of the high liftoff weight, the Titan IV is an excellent
performer in terms of GEO payload capability and relative launch cost, particularly in the
Centaur configuration[l]. The Titan IV/IUS combination is less cost-effective, since the
GEO payload capability of the configuration reduces to 2,313 kilograms for only slightly less
cost. In 1991, however, the SRBs on the vehicle will be replaced by lightweight, filament-
wound graphite composite boosters with a higher performance solid propellant. As a result,
the GEO payload capability will increase to 5,670 kilograms in the Centaur configuration,
and approximately 2,890 kilograms in the IUS configuration. Although the current launch
record of the Titan IV consists of three successful launches out of three attempts, the long
term reliability estimate for the vehicle is 95 percent.
Both vehicles provide mission versatility, albeit through different methods. In terms of
technology sophistication, the guidance package of the H-II is more advanced and unique,
although not necessarily more effective in the performance of the mission. In addition, the
cryogenic technology of the LE-5A and LE-7 engines is efficient and advanced, particularly
in comparison with the older propulsion technology of the Titan IV first and second stages.
Despite the more modern propulsion system in the H-II, however, the technology for vehic-
ular control is comparable for the two vehicles. With respect to further development, both
vehicles have future growth potential, although the growth options defined for the H-II are
dependent on the eventual success of the LE-7 engine design.
Nevertheless, the performance of the TitanIV/Centaur is substantially superior, partic-
ularly with respect to GEO payload capability and related cost. Moreover, the addition of
the new SRBS will only increase the differences in capability. On these bases, the conclu-
sion is that the H-II will generally utilize more sophisticated, modern technology than the
Titan IV, while providing significantly less payload capability at a higher cost per pound of
payload. In exchange, the H-II is expected to provide greater reliability, primarily through
the overall reduction of parts and the incorporation of simplifying system design philoso-
phies (such as the use of two stages in the vehicle rather than three). It should also be
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noted, however, that the H-II provides sufficient launch capacity for the larger commercial
satellites in the current generation, while the Titan IV is not expected to be used in a
commercial capacity. Therefore, the difference in cost per pound of payload between the
vehicles may be less significant to a potential commercial user than the overall launch cost
and related payload capability. In that case, the H-II would compare favorably to the Titan
IV.
Satellite Technology In view of the recent Super 301 trade negotiations between the U.S.
and Japan regarding the Japanese satellite market, a comparative analysis of the satellite
technology of the two programs is particularly relevant. Indeed, the central themes in the
ongoing satellite controversy have been the recognized superiority of U.S. communications
satellite technology, and the apparent efforts within Japan to establish a comparable level
of domestic satellite technology through various means (some of which were questioned
by the U.S.)[25]. In some respects, such efforts have already produced significant results,
as the Japanese have demonstrated operational capabilities in three-axis-stabilization of
GEO satellites and xenon-fueled ion propulsion techniques and will launch the two ton
experimental satellite ETS VI in 1993. In addition, the Japanese program has placed an
operational series of direct broadcasting satellites (BS-2a and b) in orbit and is developing
the BS-3 replacement series for launch in late 1990. Although the U.S. established the early
technology standard for broadcasting satellites in 1974 with the Applications Technology
Satellite VI (the ATS series was initiated by NASA in 1966), the current Japanese efforts
are comparable to the present level of U.S. technology.
Nevertheless, the U.S. capabilities in communications satellite technology are still sub-
stantially greater, particularly in terms of craft size and the number of transponders (and
thus the number of video and voice channels) per craft. Moreover, U.S. satellite technology
companies still dominate the world satellite market. For example, the Hughes Corpora-
tion of the U.S. supplies nearly half of the world's satellites and satellite systems[l]. A
comparison of satellite characteristics is presented in Table 5 for the current CS-3 series
developed in Japan, the U.S. Comstar series, and the Intelsat 6 satellite developed by the
Hughes Corporation[1l]. In view of such evidence, the U.S. clearly maintains a lead in sys-
tem performance, even in the comparison of the 1976 U.S. technology with the 1988 CS-3.
In recent years, however, the Japanese program has developed a relatively strong tech-
nical base in terms of Ka-band transponders. The Ka-band frequency, which is higher
than the Ku or the even lower C-band frequencies, has attracted interest within the satel-
lite communications arena because it requires less orbital space for operation and provides
more resistance to microwave interference. On the negative side, the Ka-band suffers from
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Satellite Launch date Mass Transponders Voice Life
(kg) Circuits
US Comstar 1976 811 24 (C/Ku) 18000 7
Intelsat 6 1989 1700 48 (C/Ku) 33000 14
CS-3 1988 550 12 (C/Ka) 6000 7
Table 5: Comparison of US and Japanese Satellites
signal obscurement due to rain attenuation. Despite the potential benefits, the U.S. has
just begun the experimental development and application of Ka-band technology with
NASA's Advanced Communications Technology Satellite, scheduled for launch on the STS
in 1992[26].
In terms of overall system capabilities, however, the issue remains the same - the U.S.
maintains a substantial lead in many of the technologies necessary for the design and
production of large scale communications satellites. Although the Japanese efforts have
been significant, U.S. levels of technology and cost efficiency in production have not yet
been attained. Nevertheless, the Japanese have achieved impressive levels of capability in
the production of components and the design and implementation of supporting hardware.
For example, as has been discussed, Japanese companies provide many of the world's
transponders and satellite ground stations. In the near term, these trends in relative
satellite technology strengths will most likely persist.
Scientific Spacecraft A comparative evaluation of U.S. and Japanese capabilities in space
science is also particularly relevant, since the space science arena has been an area of em-
phasis for both programs for many years. Moreover, the Japanese program has recently
produced a number of accomplishments in space science, including (as already mentioned)
a flyby of Halley's Comet in 1986 and the 1990 Muses-A lunar probe. In comparison, how-
ever, the U.S. space program has for many years produced notable (and often spectacular)
accomplishments in the space science arena. Furthermore, the U.S. program is currently
entering a particularly ambitious phase of space science and exploration, with an agenda
for the 1990s including interplanetary probes to Mars and Venus and the four observatories
in the Great Observatories series. From that perspective, a comparison of the technological
capabilities of the two programs is indeed timely. For the purposes of this analysis, the com-
parison shall be limited to a detailed assessment of a few representative missions for both
programs. Conclusions regarding each program's scope and level of technical capability in
space science are provided following the assessments of these missions.
In terms of program scope, the space science activities of the Japanese space program
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have primarily been concentrated in the areas of X-ray astronomy, upper atmospheric stud-
ies, and solar physics[2]. Notable exceptions to this general rule include the Halley's Comet
and lunar missions mentioned above. As of the present time, no Japanese interplanetary
missions have been conducted, although interplanetary missions in space science are listed
as a policy objective in the SAC policy document discussed earlier. Of the general areas
of concentration, a particularly productive field of study has been that of X-ray astron-
omy. Beginning with the launch of the Hakucho in 1979, three craft have been developed
and launched for X-ray studies, with the most recent being the 1987 Ginga (Astro-C).
Development is underway for the Astro-D, scheduled for launch in 1992. The Hakucho was
designed for a panoramic survey of X-ray bursts, while the Tenma (Astro-B) was developed
to observe X-ray sources in the cores of active galaxies. Neither craft involved particularly
unusual or sophisticated technology. Such was also the case for the Ginga, which was based
on existing, "off-the-shelf" technology from both domestic and international sources (the
large area proportional counter, or LAC, was supplied by Leicester University of the United
Kingdom, while the all-sky X-ray monitor and gamma burst monitor were provided by the
Los Alamos National Laboratory of the U.S.)[1]. Nevertheless, the timing of the Ginga
launch proved to be highly fortuitous, as the supernova SN87A was discovered just after
the launch date. Valuable observations of both the supernova and the galactic core were
provided by Ginga throughout 1987, filling an important gap in global activity in X-ray
astronomy.
Although the Japanese program has conducted many other successful projects in the
space science area, the flyby missions to Halley's Comet (the Suisei) and the Moon (the
Muses-A) perhaps best exemplify the current level and applications of Japanese technology
in space science. With regard to the Halley's mission, the Suisei was designed to study
the activity of the comet's hydrogen coma and investigate the bow shock generated by
the interaction between the coma and the solar wind. The craft, which was identical to
another comet rendezvous craft (the Sakigake) launched seven months earlier, contained
a Lyman-alpha imager and a plasma analyzer for these purposes. The Suisei constituted
a valuable element of an international effort to study Halley's Comet. In comparison,
the Muses-A mission, although certainly not revolutionary by current world standards of
space technology, was also significant in that the project represented the only lunar mission
conducted by a nation other than the U.S. or Soviet Union. The Muses-A craft was designed
to demonstrate orbit control and data transmission capabilities. The mission included the
release of a small lunar satellite[27]. Despite the occurrence of certain technical difficulties
with the satellite, the mission provided valuable experience and practice for future Japanese
endeavors in space science. In addition, both the Suisei and Muses-A missions greatly
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enhanced the public reputation and visibility of the Japanese space program.
With regard to the space science activities of the U.S. space program, a compact sum-
mary such as the one provided for the Japanese program is difficult to develop, primarily
because of the wide range of U.S. activities and the impressive number of noteworthy U.S.
accomplishments in the space science arena. The range and number of these accomplish-
ments can be partially demonstrated by the fact that the U.S. program actually conducted
its first successful lunar flyby in 1964 with the seventh craft of the Ranger series. During
the period of time between the Ranger 7 mission and the launch of the comparable Muses-A
mission from Japan in 1990, the U.S. program produced an impressive array of accomplish-
ments and "firsts" in space science, including the first soft landings on the Moon and Mars
(Surveyor and Viking), a variety of flyby and orbiting missions to Mercury, Venus, Mars,
and the outer planets (the Mariner, Pioneer, and Voyager series), and extensive studies
in solar physics, X-ray astronomy, and other fields of space science[29]. It should also be
noted, however, that most of these achievements occurred prior to 1980, while the decade
of the 1980s represented a period of relative inactivity for the U.S. program in space sci-
ence. Indeed, due to budgetary constraints and a temporary shortage of launch vehicles,
no interplanetary missions or major space science projects took place between the two 1978
Pioneer Venus probes and the launch of the Magellan probe in 1989 (also to Venus). In
view of these facts and the ambitious U.S. agenda outlined for the 1990s, the assessment of
U.S. capabilities in space science shall concentrate on current U.S. projects and plans rather
than past accomplishments. As with the analysis of Japanese space science activities, a
few representative U.S. projects will be evaluated in the following sections.
Although many space science projects on the current U.S. agenda are worthy of consid-
eration, the Galileo mission to Jupiter and the four observatories in the Great Observatories
program are perhaps best representative of the range of current activities in the U.S. pro-
gram. With regard to the Jupiter mission, the Galileo craft, which was launched in 1989
for a projected arrival at Jupiter in 1995, was designed to 1) release a probe into the Jovian
atmosphere for atmospheric studies and 2) establish an orbit around Jupiter for further
studies and the initiation of a series of flybys of the major Jovian moons. Due to the
insufficient thrust of the Shuttle/IUS combination used to launch the craft, however, the
plans for the mission also incorporate a gravity assist technique for the development of
the energy necessary to reach Jupiter. This technique entails an initial pass around Venus
and two subsequent loops around the Earth, with a two year intermediate pass around the
Sun inserted between the two Earth passes. In addition to providing an opportunity to
study the dark side of Venus, the gravity assist scheme will allow the craft to study various
asteroids and conduct infrared observations of the far side of the Moon[l].
38
_____I_________·II_______^_X_I__
To support such studies, the Galileo craft contains a highly sophisticated diagnostic
device known as the Near-Infrared Mapping Spectrometer (NIMS), which is capable of
classifying surface mineralogies through the application of the solar reflection spectrum.
The NIMS has never been flown before and represents a significant advancement in tech-
nology. In addition to the NIMS, the Galileo craft contains a variety of other instruments
for measuring and observing characteristics such as thermal surface properties, atmospheric
composition, magnetic fields, and plasma. In view of these instruments and the atmospheric
probe (which was designed to survive for 75 minutes through pressures up to twenty Earth
atmospheres), the Galileo mission does indeed represent an impressive advancement in the
level and quality of space science technology[30].
At the same time, however, the Galileo project illustrates the sometimes inefficient
management of the U.S. program, as the ambitious project ultimately required twelve years
to propose, design, and launch. Moreover, the project involved numerous cost overruns,
scheduling delays, and conceptual design changes during that time period (the project
was canceled four times, revived five times, and fundamentally redesigned seven times).
Although different factors contributed to these difficulties, most were related in some way
to the decision to launch the craft on the STS. For example, some delays were due to
technical complications and budgetary constraints in the concurrent development of the
STS and IUS, while others were a result of the STS downtime and the confusion regarding
safety criteria following the 1986 Challenger accident. By the time of launch, the estimated
cost of the Galileo project had risen to 1.3 billion dollars, despite the fact that the design
of the craft will represent twenty year old technology upon its arrival at Jupiter[31].
With regard to the Great Observatories series, the four observatories in the series consist
of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST), the Gamma Ray Observatory (GRO), the Advanced
X-ray Astrophysics Facility (AXAF), and the Space InfraRed Telescope Facility (SIRTF).
When fully operational, the series should be capable of providing simultaneous observations
of cosmic sources in infrared, visible, ultraviolet, X-ray, and gamma ray wavelengths. Rel-
ative to the overall U.S. space science agenda, the series constitutes the centerpiece of an
already ambitious decade[28]. Moreover, each facility involves significant advancements in
the level of space science technology. For example, the HST (launched in 1990) is expected
to eventually provide a quantum leap in visible wavelength capability relative to the best
Earth-based instruments. At full capacity the HST should allow observations of objects 50
times fainter than those presently discernible, with additional improvements of a factor of
ten in resolution capability and a factor of seven in observable distance.
In addition to the Optical Telescope Assembly (consisting of a 2.4 meter in diameter
primary mirror arranged in the Cassegrain style with a Ritchey-Chretien folded optical sys-
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tem), the HST contains five instruments for scientific studies, including 1) the Faint Object
Camera, for the detection of visible and ultraviolet light from objects that are invisible from
Earth; 2) the Faint Object Spectrograph, for measuring the chemical composition of faint
objects; 3) the High Speed Photometer, for measuring the intensity and variations of light
emitted from stellar objects; 4) the High Resolution Spectrograph, intended for studies in
the ultraviolet portion of the spectrum; and 5) the Wide Field/Planetary Camera, for both
wide field and focussed (narrow field) photography. Each of these instruments involves
highly sophisticated technology[32].
In consideration of the complexity and scale of the instrument, some technical difficulties
should be expected. Nevertheless, the HST has thus far proven to be a disappointment for
the U.S. program, as production flaws were discovered in the primary mirror after launch
and some of its expected capabilities have therefore not materialized. Until the scheduled
STS repair flight in 1993, certain instruments on the HST will unfortunately continue to
perform well below their design expectations. In combination with the 1.9 billion dollar
cost of the project (nearly twice the entire 1988 budget of the Japanese space program), the
unfortunate HST developments again illustrate the frequent inefficiency of the U.S. space
program.
The second observatory in the series is the GRO, originally intended for launch on the
STS in April 1990 but postponed due to complications. The purpose of the GRO is to
observe and measure sources of gamma rays (the most energetic form of radiation). On the
basis of such data, U.S. scientists hope to gain understanding of the high energy processes
in quasars, pulsars, supernovas, and radio galaxies. Furthermore, the observatory will
facilitate the ongoing studies of the origin of the Universe and the search for antimatter. The
GRO contains various instruments for these observations, including a pair of scintillation
spectrometers, a highly sensitive Compton telescope, an "energetic" gamma ray telescope
for high resolution observations, and a set of eight wide-field detectors (covering the entire
celestial sphere) for monitoring and locating bursts and transient sources. Combined in one
platform, these instruments constitute one of the largest observatories ever launched. As
with the HST, the GRO represents a significant advancement in space science capability
and technology[l].
Following the HST and GRO, the third observatory in the series is the AXAF, intended
for the measurement and observation of cosmic X-ray sources. The observatory is tenta-
tively scheduled for launch on the STS in 1996. Although the total cost for the program
should ultimately be about 1.5 billion dollars, NASA has implemented a phased funding
and development program to avoid the cost overruns encountered in the HST program.
The AXAF is expected to operate for at least fifteen years, with maintenance and services
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provided by STS astronauts. The primary instrumentation of the AXAF consists of a 1.2
meter in diameter (ten meter focal length) X-ray telescope and six pairs of nested focusing
mirrors. With these instruments, the AXAF will have ten times the spatial resolution and
100 times the sensitivity of its 1970s era predecessor, the HEAO-2[1].
The fourth member of the series is the SIRTF, scheduled for initial finding in 1992
and intended for launch on the STS in the late 1990s. In terms of objectives, the pur-
pose of the SIRTF is to provide detailed observations of faint cosmic sources in infrared
wavelengths, thereby continuing the work of its NASA predecessor IRAS and the European
Space Agency's ISO. In particular, the SIRTF is expected to expand the analysis of sources
detected by IRAS but not evaluated due to insufficient capability. The instrumentation
plan for SIRTF includes a 0.85 meter in diameter telescope with detectors and optics cooled
below seven degrees Kelvin by liquid helium, as well as an infrared camera, an imaging pho-
tometer, and a spectrograph[33]. Maintenance, servicing, and instrument replacement will
be accomplished through STS missions. Due to budgetary constraints, initial funding for
the SIRTF has been postponed for many years.
On the basis of a detailed assessment of the current space science projects of the U.S.
and Japanese space programs, certain conclusions regarding program objectives and ca-
pabilities can be drawn. For example, the Japanese program certainly produces "world
class" projects and data in the realm of space science, in the sense that the program
has contributed greatly to the global scientific community and is capable of participating
in meaningful and ambitious space science initiatives. At the same time, however, the
Japanese activities in space science reflect the program's emphasis on pragmatic scope and
conservative technical objectives. As a result, the Japanese program has not attained a
level or range of capabilities in space science technology equal to that of the U.S. program.
In return, the Japanese program has maintained greater continuity within its areas of con-
centration. The development and launch of three X-ray astronomy craft in less than ten
years illustrates this approach. Moreover, the program has in general demonstrated greater
efficiency and frugality in the management of space science projects.
In comparison, the current activities of the U.S. program demonstrate a continuation
of its customary emphasis on revolutionary technologies and achievements. Although these
activities should eventually make tremendous contributions to the space science community,
an additional result thus far has been the frequent occurrence of the technical and logistical
complications often associated with such projects. In addition, the U.S. program is spending
a significantly higher amount of money for those projects. For the near term, however, the
policy objectives and funding patterns for both programs indicate no significant changes
in operational philosophy, although the activities of the Japanese program may gradually
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increase in scope.
8 Conclusions
Through a combination of international licensing agreements and evolutionary development
efforts in concentrated technology areas, the Japanese space program has progressed from
the 1970 launch of its first satellite to participation in the current international space
station program. In the process, the program has achieved many worthy accomplishments,
including the contribution of valuable scientific data to the space science community, the
development of a satellite technology base, and the design and production of modern launch
vehicles. Although these technologies and systems have often not been comparable to world
(or U.S.) standards of performance, capacity, or cost, particularly on the integrated system
level, they nevertheless represent a significant step toward the establishment of indigenous
capabilities and the attainment of autonomy for certain activities. Both objectives have long
been a feature of the Japanese space program. Significantly, these efforts were primarily
based on low, yet stable, government support and funding.
On the basis of these accomplishments, Japanese program planners have sought to fur-
ther increase the capabilities, scope, and commercial utility of the space program. However,
these efforts have been constrained by the reluctance of the Japanese government to sustain
a larger public sector program and its corresponding levels of funding. As established in
this report, the commercial potential of space activities remains unclear. Moreover, as a
late-comer to this high risk technology area, the government has seemingly chosen to rely
on the private sector for long term growth. Consequently, the goals of the Japanese space
program have further evolved to include privatization and self-sufficiency. In both respects,
the program and its related industries have made some notable progress. For example,
the private sector organizations evaluated in this report constitute an important step to-
ward privatization, as do the efforts to cultivate markets and demand in the Pacific Rim.
However, at their present level of funding, activity, and experience, these organizations
truly represent just a step in that direction rather than privatization itself. Their activities
could more accurately be characterized as an investigation of technological and commercial
possibilities with government support, as opposed to legitimate commercial ventures. Nev-
ertheless, the growing private infrastructure should allow corporations to acquire greater
operational and management experience with space systems, while positioning them for
increased activity should markets for space technologies continue to develop. With respect
to the potentially critical markets in the Pacific Rim, the efforts of the program have thus
far focussed on attaining visibility as a potential service provider and demonstrating inter-
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est and capability. Although the plans for the region have not yet progressed beyond this
phase, the region will almost certainly be a focal point for future marketing efforts.
In terms of commercial demand for space technologies and services, the Japanese pro-
gram and its related industries have achieved their greatest success in the markets for
value-added industries, particularly in areas of established Japanese strength. Indeed, such
activities seem to represent one of the true cornerstones of current Japanese strategies for
benefiting from space-related markets and space technologies. This approach seems quite
consistent with the established Japanese government practice of achieving growth in high
risk areas through relying on the private sector to tailor its capabilities and efforts to exist-
ing markets and strengths. Specific examples of value-added activity outlined in this report
include satellite ground stations, transponders, and antennas, as well as the potential sale
of the LE-5 rocket engine. In addition, Japanese manufacturers should prosper in the mar-
kets for miniaturized broadcasting and communications system components and hardware.
These industries represent the true focal point of Japan's private sector activities in space-
related markets and technologies. Due to the cost and capacity constraints evaluated in
the report, other Japanese technologies, particularly those on the integrated system level,
have not yet become commercially viable and remain more oriented to self-reliance and
the pursuit of autonomous capability. Moreover, liabilities such as the comparatively low
operational experience base of the program and Japan's late entry to many of the systems
markets will continue to limit the commercialization efforts for those systems.
Despite the promise of the value-added industries and the long term strategy of priva-
tization, however, the research and system level activities of the Japanese program remain
largely reliant on public sector funding and management. Based on the evidence provided
by the program's funding history as a function of GNP, this funding is not likely to increase
dramatically in the near future. As a result, the program will probably continue to utilize
evolutionary development philosophies and participate in international projects when pos-
sible. In effect, it will remain a small, public sector-oriented program for the near term,
but with a strong value-added industrial sector and a slowly evolving private infrastructure
for developing and managing space activities. With regard to privatization strategies, the
program will almost certainly continue to rely on private sector activities and the emerging
private sector infrastructure for long term growth. Although the level of private sector
activity remains low at this time, these activities and organizations nevertheless signify a
positioning of Japanese space industries for the space technology arena. In that respect,
the Japanese space program will almost certainly continue to emerge as one of the world's
leading programs, and will without question be a factor in the future development of space.
With regard to the capabilities and future of the U.S. space program, a dramatic reduc-
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tion in the capabilities of the program will probably not occur in the near future. Public
support for the existence of a space program remains moderately high in spite of the cur-
rent budgetary dilemmas of the U.S. Moreover, most government officials seem to believe
that a space program in some form is justifiable and politically acceptable. Consequently,
the probability of draconian reductions in space program funding is relatively low. Nev-
ertheless, in the near term the U.S. program will face increasing public and governmental
scrutiny as a result of the poor management and disastrous failures of recent years. In
addition, the current fiscal difficulties of the U.S. will almost certainly preclude substantial
increases in space program funding.
In view of such factors, the U.S. space program will face a significant and fundamental
challenge in the 1990s - the search for an acceptable compromise between its propensity for
large scale, revolutionary projects and the funding constraints resulting from the current
budgetary and political climate in the U.S. The philosophical alternative is to ignore such
fiscal realities in the selection of projects, thereby risking the onset of another period of
project delays and cancellations, technical failures, and potential accidents as a result of
inconsistencies between program goals and program funding. At the same time, policy
makers for the U.S. program may be forced to reconcile the differences between quality
science and revolutionary science in the evaluation of potential projects, while recognizing
that sustained research and development will be necessary to preserve the capabilities and
leadership of the program. Although the U.S. space program will continue to be a leading
innovator in the space technology arena, some changes in its operational style and philoso-
phy will probably become necessary. One such change may very likely be the development
of a policy to participate more frequently in major international projects, particularly those
involving a genuine distribution of funding and managerial responsibilities. In that event,
the gradual emergence of Japan as a space-faring nation will indeed be of significance to
the U.S. space program, as well as to the other space-faring nations of the world.
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